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NOTES 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, CSLI TRACKING, 
AND THE MOSAIC THEORY 
Christian Bennardo* 
 
Law enforcement officials and privacy advocates have long clashed over 
the police’s ability to access and use information related to cell phones 
during criminal investigations.  From wiretapping to physical searches of 
phones, the competing investigatory and privacy interests continue to battle 
for priority on a number of different fronts.  This Note addresses the 
disagreement between academic scholarship and federal circuit courts over 
the proper resolution to one particular issue:  cell site location information 
(CSLI). 
CSLI refers to the records kept by a cellular service provider indicating 
the approximate location of a customer’s phone over time.  Police often 
procure CSLI from providers to track a suspect’s movements in relation to 
criminal activity.  However, when they do so without a warrant, courts are 
forced to determine whether the police violated the suspect’s Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches. 
To date, all of the circuit courts to address this issue have held that 
warrantless CSLI monitoring is permitted under the Fourth Amendment.  
Many scholars, however, argue to the contrary, criticizing these decisions 
and creating a rift between the academic and judicial treatment of CSLI. 
This Note explores the CSLI debate by analyzing the circuit courts’ 
decisions, scholars’ disagreement with those decisions, and the alternative 
approaches offered to protect and evaluate CSLI records.  This Note 
concludes that warrantless CSLI monitoring should be analyzed under the 
“mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment.  In support, it argues that this 
theory best addresses the concerns with CSLI tracking and proposes a 
standard that courts may use to apply it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By the time you sat down to read this Note today, you likely used your cell 
phone to make a number of calls, to send many more text messages and 
emails, and to refresh your Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter accounts.  If 
you paid your latest bill, your cellular service provider was happy to make 
all of these actions possible.  However, while you were busy staying 
connected with family and friends, your service provider was also hard at 
work:  recording your location—one phone call, text message, and social 
media post at a time. 
In fact, service providers approximate and record the location of the cell 
phones that they service even when their owners are not actively using them.1  
Any time a cell phone is turned on, it automatically identifies and registers 
with the nearest cell tower—also called a cell site—every seven seconds in 
 
 1. See Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment:  A 
Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 736 (2011). 
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order to communicate.2  At each registration, the provider obtains and records 
a “plethora of information” about the phone, including its approximate 
location relative to the cell site with which it registered.3  This data is known 
as cell site location information (CSLI). 
Because cell phones constantly connect with the nearest tower, providers 
possess an almost complete record of a phone’s location over a given time 
period.4  As a result, law enforcement officials often obtain and use CSLI 
during criminal investigations to locate a suspect near the scene of a recent 
crime or to track his movements in relation to a series of crimes.5 
Generally speaking, law enforcement’s ability to access and use cell-
phone-related information has given rise to a number of questions about the 
amount of privacy individuals have with their phones:  How much of what 
users say is private?  What about how they said it or to whom they said it?  Is 
it reasonable to expect privacy in today’s advanced digital era?  And lastly, 
do users have any protection from those who wish to access this information?  
Questions like these are not novel inquiries.  However, the individuals and 
institutions considering these issues do not always agree on how to resolve 
them.  CSLI falls into this category. 
In particular, many courts have had to address whether the government 
may obtain and use CSLI from an individual’s service provider without a 
search warrant.  To date, all of the federal circuit courts to confront this issue 
have held that warrantless CSLI monitoring is not a Fourth Amendment 
violation.6  As these decisions have been handed down, however, both 
scholars and students have considered the issue and analyzed specific cases 
appearing before the courts.7  Significantly, these commentators are largely 
critical of the circuit courts’ holdings and rationales8 and advocate for 
protection of CSLI under the Fourth Amendment.9  These criticisms create a 
divisive split between judicial and academic treatment of warrantless CSLI 
 
 2. See Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s Use 
of Cell Tower Dumps in Its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 5 (2013). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Stephen E. Henderson, Real-Time and Historic Location Surveillance After 
United States v. Jones:  An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 803, 805–06 (2013). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that 
the government obtained a CSLI for seven months); United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 
342 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that the government obtained CSLI for 221 days from the 
defendants’ service providers), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. 
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 501 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that the government obtained CSLI for 
sixty-seven days); In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 
F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Historical Cell Site Data Case] (noting that government 
requested CSLI for a two-month time period). 
 6. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 424; Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 890; Davis, 785 F.3d at 500; 
Historical Cell Site Data Case, 724 F.3d at 615; In re Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose, 620 
F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that while warrantless procurement of CSLI is not a per 
se violation of the Fourth Amendment, a magistrate has the option to require the government 
to obtain a warrant in some circumstances). 
 7. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. See infra Part II.C. 
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tracking, a split that circuits that have yet to address the issue will have to 
consider when CSLI-related cases appear on their dockets. 
This Note addresses whether law enforcement officials should be required 
to obtain a warrant before procuring CSLI records to monitor an individual’s 
movements.  Part I discusses the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and then explains the mechanics of CSLI and how law 
enforcement currently obtains this information under the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA).10  Then, Part II articulates the disagreement 
between the federal appellate judiciary and academia over the warrantless 
procurement of CSLI, and it outlines the alternative approaches that 
commentators have proposed to protect and analyze CSLI. 
Part III seeks to reconcile the competing arguments in the debate over the 
warrantless use of CSLI records.  It argues that courts should apply the 
“mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment to determine the constitutionality 
of CSLI monitoring.  In doing so, this part joins other scholars who advocate 
for the theory, explains why it is best suited to address the underlying 
concerns with CSLI disclosure, and adds to the discussion by proposing a 
standard under which courts may apply the mosaic theory to CSLI.  Lastly, 
this part recognizes that the standard it offers does not solve all of the 
problems that arise when implementing this theory.  Nonetheless, the 
standard can serve as an initial step toward creating a more complete, viable 
framework that permits the application of the mosaic theory to CSLI tracking. 
I.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, CSLI, AND THE SCA 
This part explains the U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the mechanics and details of CSLI, and how law enforcement 
obtains this information under the SCA. 
A.  Katz and Fourth Amendment Searches 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches.”11  Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment protected 
only against governmental searches that “physically intruded” upon an 
individual’s body or property.12  However, in Katz v. United States,13 the 
Supreme Court expanded the Fourth Amendment’s protections and held that 
a search can occur even absent physical trespass.14 
 
 10. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 12. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 2.1(a), at 575–76 (5th ed. 2012); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) 
(holding that the Fourth Amendment is not violated “unless there has been . . . an actual 
physical invasion”). 
 13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 14. Id. at 353 (holding that the government conducted an unreasonable search by using an 
electronic listening device attached to a public telephone booth to record the defendant’s 
conversation). 
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In his concurring opinion in Katz, Justice John Marshall Harlan II 
articulated what has become the current two-prong standard for determining 
when a search occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.15  A 
search occurs when the government’s action violates an expectation of 
privacy that is both (1) actually (subjectively) held by an individual and (2) 
recognized by society as (objectively) reasonable.16 
However, the Fourth Amendment protects only against “unreasonable” 
searches.17  Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.18  
Therefore, when the government violates an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy without a warrant, an unconstitutional search has 
occurred.19 
Although Katz broadened the scope of the Fourth Amendment beyond 
physical intrusions, just how far its protections extend remains unclear.20  
The Katz standard does not “dictate what a reasonable expectation of privacy 
is.”21  Instead, it provides a framework for courts and judges to make this 
determination on a case-by-case basis.22 
B.  The Third-Party Doctrine 
Although the Katz standard does not predict a specific result,23 the 
Supreme Court clarified its analysis in the 1970s, crafting what has become 
known as the third-party doctrine.  First, in United States v. Miller,24 the 
government compelled two banks to disclose all records concerning any 
accounts in the defendant’s name.25  The defendant contended that the 
government’s procurement of the records was a violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights.26  The Court, however, disagreed and concluded that the 
defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the financial 
records.27 
The Court first found that the records were not the defendant’s “private 
papers.”28  Rather, the documents obtained were the “business records of the 
banks,”29 as the information they contained was recorded and kept by the 
 
 15. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 16. Id. 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 18. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011). 
 19. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). 
 20. LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 2.1(b), at 582; see Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, 
and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 252 (1993). 
 21. See Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” 
Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 12 (2009). 
 22. See id.; see also Cloud, supra note 20, at 253 (explaining that the Katz standard allows 
judges to determine which privacy expectations are reasonable based on their own ideas). 
 23. See Winn, supra note 21, at 12. 
 24. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 25. Id. at 437–38. 
 26. Id. at 442. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 440. 
 29. Id. 
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banks in the “ordinary course of business.”30  As a result, the Court found 
that the defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
records’ contents.31 
The Court then explained that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent the 
government from obtaining “information revealed to a third party . . . even if 
the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a 
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be 
betrayed.”32  Because the defendant voluntarily conveyed the information in 
the records to the banks, the government did not violate his Fourth 
Amendment rights by thereafter obtaining that information.33 
Three years later, in Smith v. Maryland,34 the Supreme Court reached a 
similar conclusion.  In that case, the police requested that the defendant’s 
phone company install a pen register device to record all of the numbers the 
defendant dialed from his home phone.35  The government then obtained the 
list of numbers from the phone company and introduced it as evidence against 
the defendant in his trial for robbery.36  As in Miller, the defendant contended 
that the government’s actions violated his Fourth Amendment rights.37 
Once again, however, the Court disagreed and mirrored its reasoning in 
Miller to find that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the list of numbers.  The Court held that “a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.”38  It explained that regardless of whether a pen register device is 
installed, telephone users know they reveal the numbers dialed from their 
phones to the phone company.39  Thus, because the defendant “voluntarily 
conveyed” the numbers to the telephone company,40 his privacy interest in 
the numbers did not satisfy the second prong of the Katz standard.41 
Today, Katz, Miller, and Smith are the foundation of the third-party 
doctrine—that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information voluntarily revealed to third parties.42  Because the 
individual’s expectation of privacy fails the objective prong of the Katz test, 
the government does not conduct an unreasonable search by subsequently 
gathering that information.43  Importantly, the methods of generating and 
recording information in CSLI records make the third-party doctrine 
particularly relevant in this context. 
 
 30. Id. at 442. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. at 443. 
 33. See id. 
 34. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 35. Id. at 737. 
 36. Id. at 737–38. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 743–44. 
 39. Id. at 742. 
 40. Id. at 744. 
 41. See id. at 745. 
 42. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 43. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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C.  The Technology Behind CSLI 
As previously noted, CSLI refers to the information generated by the 
communication of a mobile phone and cell tower, or cell site, constructed by 
the phone’s service provider.  Anytime a cell phone is turned on, it sends out 
a radio signal that identifies the nearest tower with which the phone then 
“registers” to obtain service.44  The registration process occurs each time the 
phone is used to communicate, such as through a phone call or text 
message.45  However, even when the phone is not being used to 
communicate, the registration process occurs automatically every seven 
seconds, so long as the phone is powered on.46  Therefore, the only way to 
prevent registration is to turn the phone off.47 
As the phone moves from one tower to the next, it continues to register, 
and the signal strength fluctuates accordingly, as indicated by the signal icon 
on the phone.48  Towers measure the signal strength and, thus, the relative 
location of the phone through two methods.49  The first method, known as 
time difference of arrival (TDOA), approximates the distance between the 
cell phone and tower by calculating the amount of time it takes for the signal 
to travel between the two.50  The second method, known as angle of arrival 
(AOA), determines a phone’s position based on the angle at which its signal 
reaches the tower.51  When three or more towers receive a signal from the 
phone, service providers can locate a phone even more precisely using 
“triangulation methods.”52  Triangulation uses information about the signal’s 
strength and the angle at which it was received at each tower to “virtually 
pinpoint” the phone’s location.53 
The accuracy of the location data also depends on the number of, and 
distance between, cell towers in a given area.54  As the number of towers in 
a given region increases, the geographic area that each tower services 
 
 44. Owsley, supra note 2, at 5. 
 45. See Shannon Jaeckel, Comment, Cell Phone Location Tracking:  Reforming the 
Standard to Reflect Modern Privacy Expectations, 77 LA. L. REV. 143, 147 (2016); see also 
Susan Freiwald, Light in the Darkness:  How the LEATPR Standards Guide Legislators in 
Regulating Law Enforcement Access to Cell Site Location Records, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 875, 
885 (2014) (discussing location data generated through the use of downloadable applications 
such as email, Facebook, or Twitter). 
 46. Owsley, supra note 2, at 5. 
 47. See Stephanie Lockwood, Who Knows Where You’ve Been?:  Privacy Concerns 
Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 309 
(2004) (noting that once a phone is turned off, it no longer registers with a tower). But see 
Freiwald, supra note 1, at 705 (suggesting that “further active intervention” may be required 
to prevent registration). 
 48. See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?:  Toward 
Reasonable Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could 
Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 127 (2012); see also United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 
880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that a cell phone user sees her phone’s signal strength fluctuate 
in accordance with the phone’s location relative to the nearest tower). 
 49. See Lockwood, supra note 47, at 308. 
 50. See id. at 308–09. 
 51. See id. at 309. 
 52. Freiwald, supra note 1, at 712. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 710. 
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decreases.55  In urban areas, cell towers are more concentrated to 
accommodate for increased communications.56  In these areas, towers are 
typically placed within a few hundred feet of each other.57  Thus, a phone’s 
signal has to travel only a few hundred feet to reach the closest tower.58  By 
contrast, in rural towns, towers can be located several miles apart.59  As a 
result, a phone’s signal must travel several miles before registering with the 
closest tower, diminishing the accuracy of the phone’s location.60 
At the same time registration occurs, however, the phone’s service 
provider records the information used to generate the connection between the 
phone and the tower.61  CSLI refers to the information contained in these 
records.  In particular, at each registration, the service provider records which 
cell tower the phone registered with, which portion of the tower is facing the 
phone at that time, and how strong the signal is, which indicates the distance 
between the phone and tower at the time of registration.62  While CSLI does 
not include the content of any particular communication,63 it allows service 
providers to estimate the location of the phone within one hundred feet or 
less.64 
Over a period of a time, CSLI allows the service provider to create a 
“virtual map.”65  This map is comprised of data points indicating where the 
phone’s user has traveled and for how long.66  As a result, service providers 
maintain a “virtually complete record of a customer’s location at all times.”67 
CSLI records can be further divided into two categories:  historical and 
prospective location data.68  Historical CSLI allows police to determine the 
past locations of a cell phone using information from towers that the phone 
previously contacted.69  Prospective, or real-time, CSLI permits police to 
determine the phone’s current location as it registers with each tower.70  
However, prospective CSLI remains outside the scope of this Note, which 
addresses only the government’s ability to obtain historical CSLI from 
service providers.71  Significantly, though, at least one scholar found that 
 
 55. See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 48, at 127; see also David Oscar Markus & Nathan 
Freed Wessler, That ’70s Show:  Why the 11th Circuit Was Wrong to Rely on Cases from the 
1970s to Decide a Cell-Phone Tracking Case, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1179, 1183 (2016). 
 56. Freiwald, supra note 1, at 710. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Owsley, supra note 2, at 5. 
 62. See id. 
 63. R. Craig Curtis et al., Using Technology the Founders Never Dreamed Of:  Phones as 
Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment, 4 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 61, 63 (2014). 
 64. Owsley, supra note 2, at 33. 
 65. Freiwald, supra note 1, at 705–06. 
 66. See id. 
 67. Henderson, supra note 4, at 806. 
 68. Curtis et al., supra note 63, at 63. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. There is currently a debate over whether historical and prospective CSLI should be 
subject to the same legal analysis for Fourth Amendment purposes. Compare Curtis et al., 
2017] CSLI TRACKING AND THE MOSAIC THEORY 2393 
many courts have “held that the Fourth Amendment requires a [search] 
warrant to obtain such forward-looking data.”72 
Nonetheless, law enforcement officials often seek to obtain historical CSLI 
from service providers during criminal investigations.73  In many cases, 
police use this information to track a suspect’s movements in relation to the 
scene of a recent crime.74  Cell site data is particularly useful when 
investigating serial crimes such as robberies, assaults, and home invasions.75  
Not surprisingly, defendants often challenge the admissibility of this 
evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation of their Fourth 
Amendment protections.76  Courts considering these challenges, therefore, 
have had to determine whether and how the government may procure CSLI.77 
D.  The SCA and CSLI Disclosure 
The SCA currently regulates the government’s access to cell-phone-related 
records.78  The statute divides communication information that the 
government seeks into two separate categories.79  The first category, found 
under § 2703(a)–(b), includes the content of communications.80  The second 
category, found under § 2703(c), includes the “records concerning electronic 
communication service or remote computing service.”81  Because CSLI does 
not include the content of any communication, “most courts . . . have 
assumed” it falls into the latter group.82 
Under § 2703(c), the government may compel a service provider to 
disclose these “records” by obtaining (1) a search warrant supported by 
probable cause,83 (2) consent of the customer for whom they seek the 
information,84 or (3) a court order pursuant to § 2703(d).85  In turn, § 2703(d) 
provides that a court order will be granted if the government offers “specific 
 
supra note 63, at 89–91 (arguing for a uniform, probable cause standard for access to all CSLI), 
and Freiwald, supra note 1, at 738–40 (arguing that the historical nature of the location data 
should not change the legal analysis), with Pell & Soghoian, supra note 48, at 174–93 
(proposing a statute that governs law enforcement’s access to historical and prospective CSLI 
differently). 
 72. Freiwald, supra note 1, at 698–99. 
 73. See P. Kramer Rice, You Are Here:  Tracking Around the Fourth Amendment to 
Protect Smartphone Geolocation Information with the GPS Act, 38 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 17, 
23–24 (2013); see also Pell & Soghoian, supra note 48, at 120–21. 
 74. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016); United States 
v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 885 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 501 
(11th Cir. 2015). 
 75. See Owsley, supra note 2, at 6. 
 76. See, e.g., Graham, 824 F.3d at 424; Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 885–86; Davis, 785 F.3d 
at 504. 
 77. See infra Part II.A. 
 78. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
 79. Id. § 2703(a)–(c). 
 80. Id. § 2703(a)–(b). 
 81. Id. § 2703(c). 
 82. Freiwald, supra note 45, at 883.  Some scholars, however, question the validity of this 
assumption. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 83. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A). 
 84. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(C). 
 85. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(B). 
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and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” 
the information sought is relevant to a current investigation.86 
Importantly, the “specific and articulable facts” standard is less stringent 
than the probable cause standard required to obtain a search warrant.87  As a 
result, the government often procures CSLI using a court order under 
§ 2703(d), commonly referred to as a “‘d’ order,”88 rather than a warrant.89 
E.  The Supreme Court and Government Surveillance 
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the warrantless 
procurement of CSLI, such as through the use of a “d order,” violates the 
Fourth Amendment.  However, the Court has decided similar cases involving 
technological surveillance by the government.  These decisions inform the 
CSLI analysis. 
First, in United States v. Knotts,90 the government placed a beeper inside a 
chemical container, which the defendant then transported from Minnesota to 
Wisconsin by car.91  The beeper emitted periodic radio signals, which the 
government picked up using a radio receiver.92  This enabled the government 
to track the container and, thus, the defendant’s location from one state to the 
next.93  Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress the location 
information obtained through the beeper.94 
The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which held that the 
warrantless monitoring of the defendant’s location did not violate his Fourth 
Amendment rights.95  Because he “travelled over . . . public streets,” the 
defendant “voluntarily conveyed” his location to anyone who looked his 
way.96  As a result, the Court held that a person “traveling in an automobile 
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another.”97 
 
 86. Id. § 2703(d). But see infra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing the 
disagreement between the Third and Fifth Circuits over whether the language of § 2703(d) 
gives a court discretion to issue an order upon the government satisfying this standard). 
 87. Historical Cell Site Data Case, 724 F.3d 600, 606 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 88. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s 
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1219 (2004); see Freiwald, supra note 
45, at 880–81. 
 89. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 2016); United States 
v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 884 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 502 
(11th Cir. 2015); Historical Cell Site Data Case, 724 F.3d at 602; In re Elec. Commc’n Serv. 
to Disclose, 620 F.3d at 305; see also Steven M. Franklin, Comment, Big Brother Is Watching 
You:  Government Surveillance Through Cell-Site Location Information and the Fourth 
Circuit’s Attempt to Stop It, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 493, 498 (2016). 
 90. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 91. Id. at 277. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 279. 
 95. Id. at 285. 
 96. Id. at 281–82. 
 97. Id. 
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Second, in United States v. Karo,98 the government again placed a beeper 
inside a chemical container, which was then used to locate the container 
inside of the defendant’s home.99  The Court held the government’s 
warrantless monitoring violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
protections.100  Distinguishing Knotts, the Court found the government 
gained information about the inside of the defendant’s home that could not 
otherwise be visually verified.101  As a result, the Court held that the 
warrantless monitoring of property within one’s home, which is hidden from 
“public view,” violates the privacy interests one has within his home.102 
Lastly, in United States v. Jones,103 the government installed a global 
positioning system (GPS) device on the defendant’s car and tracked its 
movements for twenty-eight days.104  Relying on the traditional trespass-
based approach of the Fourth Amendment, the Court held that the 
government violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights because it 
“physically occupied private property” without a warrant to install the 
device.105  However, five Justices wrote or joined concurring opinions 
analyzing the case under a different approach, focusing on the government’s 
GPS surveillance rather than the trespass. 
Justice Alito, writing for Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, wrote that 
“long[] term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
[one’s] expectation[] of privacy.”106  Although he noted that short-term 
monitoring would not implicate the Fourth Amendment,107 Justice Alito 
doubted that people expect law enforcement to trace an individual’s 
movements over a long period of time.108  Justice Alito did not specify at 
what point the monitoring becomes a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.109  However, he noted that “the line was surely crossed before 
the 4-week mark.”110 
Justice Sotomayor, writing alone, also focused on the government’s use of 
GPS surveillance and framed the issue in the case under a similar 
approach.111  Although she agreed with Justice Alito’s concerns about long-
term monitoring,112 Justice Sotomayor wrote first that “even short-term 
monitoring” can be problematic.113  She noted that GPS monitoring creates 
a “comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a 
 
 98. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 99. Id. at 708. 
 100. Id. at 714. 
 101. Id. at 715. 
 102. Id. at 716. 
 103. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 104. Id. at 948. 
 105. Id. at 949. 
 106. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
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 111. See id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 112. Id. at 955. 
 113. Id. 
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wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”114  Focusing on the “sum of one’s public 
movements,”115 she then stated that the proper inquiry is “whether people 
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a 
manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their 
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”116 
Justice Sotomayor also questioned validity of the third-party doctrine.117  
She stated that the doctrine is “ill suited to the digital age,”118 as people today 
reveal a vast amount of information about themselves to third parties in 
carrying out “mundane tasks.”119  In her view, information that has been 
disclosed to “some member of the public for a limited purpose” does not 
necessarily lose Fourth Amendment protection solely for that reason.120 
Nonetheless, because Jones dealt with GPS devices and because the 
majority’s holding was rooted in trespass, circuit courts have not applied 
Jones in the context of CSLI, where physical trespass is absent.  And despite 
Justices Alito’s and Sotomayor’s concurring opinions, circuit courts have 
continually held that the warrantless procurement of CSLI is not a Fourth 
Amendment violation.121  However, many scholars disagree with these 
decisions and support the opposite position using a number of different 
rationales.122 
II.  CSLI TRACKING:  JUDICIAL OUTCOMES 
AND ACADEMIA’S RESPONSE 
This part articulates the disagreement between the federal appellate 
judiciary and academia over the warrantless use of CSLI records. 
A.  Circuit Court Treatment of CSLI 
As discussed, § 2703(c) of the SCA permits the government to obtain CSLI 
with a court order rather than a search warrant.123  And because the “specific 
and articulable facts” standard required for such an order is less stringent than 
the probable cause standard required for a warrant,124 the government 
commonly relies on this section to procure CSLI from service providers.125  
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 956. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. at 957. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (“People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular 
providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to 
their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to 
online retailers.”). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See infra Part II.A. 
 122. See infra Part II.B. 
 123. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B) (2012). 
 124. Historical Cell Site Data Case, 724 F.3d 600, 606 (5th Cir. 2013); In re Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 125. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
2017] CSLI TRACKING AND THE MOSAIC THEORY 2397 
When defendants move to suppress this evidence on Fourth Amendment 
grounds, the central inquiry under Katz is whether mobile phone customers 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI.126 
To date, four of the five circuit courts to address this question have 
answered in the negative.127  In these jurisdictions, therefore, the government 
may lawfully procure CSLI from service providers without a warrant.  In 
support of their holdings, the circuit courts have relied primarily on two 
rationales.  First, all of these circuit courts found that the third-party doctrine 
prevents individuals from maintaining a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
CSLI.128  Second, most of these circuits also found that the data contained in 
CSLI is analogous to the business records kept by a private company, which 
are not subject to Fourth Amendment protections.129 
1.  Application of the Third-Party Doctrine 
First, as noted, most of the circuits have used the third-party doctrine to 
conclude that mobile phone users do not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in CSLI.  Recently, for example, in United States v. Graham,130 the 
government procured CSLI for the defendants’ cell phones for 221 days.131  
The government obtained the information through a court order under 
§ 2703(d) of the SCA132 and then used the CSLI to track the defendants’ 
locations in relation to several robberies.133 
At trial, the defendants moved to suppress the CSLI evidence.134  The 
district court denied the motions,135 and the defendants appealed to the 
Fourth Circuit, where a three-judge panel held that the government’s 
warrantless procurement of CSLI was an unreasonable search under the 
 
 126. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 127. Id. at 427; United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016); United States 
v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015); Historical Cell Site Data Case, 724 F.3d at 614–
15. But see In re Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose, 620 F.3d at 312, 319 (declining to address 
whether defendants maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI, but holding that 
the government may not always be required to secure a warrant before obtaining it). 
 128. See, e.g., Graham, 824 F.3d at 427; Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 889; Davis, 785 F.3d at 
511; Historical Cell Site Data Case, 724 F.3d at 610–14. 
 129. See, e.g., Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 885–86; Historical Cell Site Data Case, 724 F.3d at 
611–12. 
 130. 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 131. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 341 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 
421. 
 132. Id. at 343. 
 133. Id. at 342–43. 
 134. Id. at 342. 
 135. Id. 
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Fourth Amendment.136  However, after a rehearing en banc, the Fourth 
Circuit reversed the panel’s decision.137 
The court expressly held that “individuals do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in . . . CSLI.”138  In support of its holding, the court 
noted that the third-party doctrine resolved any issues regarding the 
government’s procurement of CSLI139:  by using their cell phones, the 
defendants necessarily revealed their location to their third-party service 
provider, Sprint/Nextel.140  Therefore, they could not claim a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the information,141 and the government was 
permitted to obtain the CSLI using only a court order.142 
The Fourth Circuit found support for its application of the third-party 
doctrine to CSLI in its sister circuits’ decisions.143  In United States v. 
Carpenter,144 for example, the Sixth Circuit confronted facts similar to those 
in Graham.  In Carpenter, the government obtained a year’s worth of CSLI, 
which was used to track the defendants’ location in relation to a robbery and 
other related crimes.145  The government compelled the defendants’ service 
providers to disclose the information through a court order under 
§ 2703(d).146 
Relying on the third-party doctrine, the Sixth Circuit held that mobile 
phone users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI.147  The 
court found that cell phone users knowingly expose their location to their 
service providers for at least two reasons.148  First, most cell phone users have 
seen their phone’s signal strength fluctuate through its signal icon.149  Thus, 
users know that they are exposing their location to the nearest tower and the 
service provider that operates it.150  Second, cell phone users know that they 
will be billed for “roaming” charges when they use their phone outside of the 
provider’s network.151  Thus, customers should know that service providers 
record their locational information.152  As a result, the court held that cell 
 
 136. Id. at 343.  Although the panel found that the warrantless procurement of CSLI 
violated the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights, it affirmed the district court’s denial of the 
suppression motions on other grounds. Id. at 361, 363.  Nonetheless, as the Fourth Circuit later 
noted en banc, the panel’s holding instructed the government to first secure a search warrant 
before procuring CSLI from providers in the future. Graham, 824 F.3d at 424. 
 137. Graham, 824 F.3d at 424 (holding that “the Government’s acquisition of historical 
CSLI from Defendants’ cell phone provider did not violate the Fourth Amendment”). 
 138. Id. at 428. 
 139. Id. at 427. 
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 141. Id. at 435–36. 
 142. Id. at 438. 
 143. Id. at 428 (noting that the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that mobile 
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 144. 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016). 
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phone users lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI because they 
knowingly expose their location to their service providers.153 
The Fifth Circuit, in In re Application of the United States for Historical 
Cell Site Data,154 took a position similar to that of the Fourth and Sixth 
Circuits.  The court noted first that cell phone use is completely voluntarily 
on the part of the user.155  Second, the court found that mobile phone 
customers “understand” that their location is being used by the service 
provider to deliver a signal to the customer’s phone.156  Therefore, the user’s 
knowledge that their location will be revealed to their third-party provider 
precludes a claim of privacy in CSLI.157  As a result, the court held that a 
warrant is not required to obtain it.158 
2.  The Business Record Analogy 
Some circuits have considered not only the method of collecting CSLI but 
also the nature of the data it contains.  The Sixth Circuit, for example, noted 
that the information contained in CSLI excludes the actual content of any 
communication.159  Rather, the court found that CSLI merely represents the 
“information necessary to get those communications from point A to point 
B.”160  In doing so, the Sixth Circuit analogized CSLI to the business records 
discussed in Miller and Smith.161  It found that CSLI was “created and 
maintained”162 by the service provider for legitimate purposes.163  While the 
Fourth Amendment protects the private contents of communications, 
individuals do not maintain a protected interest in the business records 
created by a company.164  The government’s subsequent gathering of that 
information is therefore not a violation of a cell phone user’s privacy.165 
The Eleventh Circuit also found this rationale persuasive.  In United States 
v. Davis,166 the government obtained CSLI for a period of sixty-seven days 
to trace the defendant’s location in relation to series of seven robberies.167  
After the defendant was convicted, he appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.168  A 
three-judge panel held that because the government obtained the data 
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pursuant to a court order rather than a warrant, the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated.169  After a rehearing en banc, however, the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision, holding that the defendant did not 
have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in CSLI.170 
The court held that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in CSLI in part because the information constituted a business record 
of the service provider.171  The court found that the CSLI records did not 
belong to the defendant, “even if [they] concern[ed] him.”172  Rather, the 
“records were created by [the service provider], stored on its own premises, 
and subject to its control.”173  The court further explained that CSLI excluded 
the “private communications” of the defendant and was used by the company 
only for legitimate business purposes.174  Therefore, the defendant could not 
claim ownership of, or privacy in, the CSLI records.175  As a result, the 
government was not required to obtain a warrant before compelling the 
service provider to disclose the locational information.176 
3.  The Third Circuit’s Discretionary Standard 
Although most circuits have based their holdings on the third-party 
doctrine, the Third Circuit declined to do so.  Its holding in In re Electronic 
Communication Service to Disclose177 departs from those of its sister circuits 
in a significant way.  In that case, a magistrate judge denied the government’s 
request for a court order compelling a service provider to disclose CSLI.178  
In doing so, the magistrate judge held that a cell phone is a “tracking device,” 
which is not governed by the SCA.179  Consequently, the government was 
required to show probable cause to obtain a search warrant before accessing 
the phone’s locational information.180 
On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected the government’s argument that cell 
phone users lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI based on the 
third-party doctrine.181  The court found that a “cell phone customer has not 
‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a cellular provider in any 
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meaningful way,” as the customer is likely unaware that his provider collects 
such data.182  Nevertheless, the court declined to directly address whether 
individuals maintain a privacy interest the location information.183  Instead, 
the Third Circuit turned to the language of the SCA to determine whether a 
warrant was required to obtain it. 
First, the court rejected the contention that a cell phone is a tracking device 
and, therefore, not covered by the SCA.184  Rather, the court noted that 
§ 2703(d) of SCA applies to CSLI because the information is derived from 
“wire communication,”185 which is explicitly governed by the statute and 
accessible by the government with a court order.186  Thus, it held that 
“CSLI . . . is obtainable under a § 2307(d) order,” regardless of the third-
party doctrine’s effect and “that such an order does not require the traditional 
probable cause determination.”187 
However, the court then explained that a court order may not be sufficient 
in all circumstances and granted the magistrate judge discretion in 
determining whether a warrant should be required in a given case.188  Section 
2703(d) states that a “court order for disclosure . . . may be issued by any 
court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if” the 
“specific and articulable facts” standard is met.189  The Third Circuit 
explained that the word “may” is the “language of permission”190 and that 
the phrase “only if” is used to denote a necessary condition, not a sufficient 
one.191  As a result, the court held that even if the government meets the 
“specific and articulable facts” standard required for a court order, the SCA 
“gives the [magistrate judge] the option to require a warrant showing 
probable cause.”192  Nonetheless, in remanding the case, the Third Circuit 
noted that although requiring a warrant is an available option, it should be 
“used sparingly because Congress also included the option of a § 2703(d) 
order.”193 
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B.  Academic Treatment of CSLI 
As the circuit courts have ruled on CSLI-related cases, scholars and 
students have tracked this issue and analyzed the courts’ decisions.194  
Significantly, this scholarship clashes with the circuit courts’ holdings, as 
many commentators argue that cell phone users do, in fact, have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in CSLI.195  In support of this conclusion, they 
contend that the third-party doctrine is inapplicable to locational data,196 
reject the proposition that CSLI is merely a business record,197 and even 
question whether § 2703(c) of the SCA governs cell phone location data at 
all.198 
1.  A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in CSLI 
On a fundamental level, many scholars and commentators disagree with 
the notion that mobile phone customers lack a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in CSLI.199  To the contrary, cell phone users maintain “both a 
subjective and an objective expectation of privacy” in location data, 
satisfying the Katz standard and rendering the government’s warrantless 
procurement of CSLI an unreasonable search.200 
First, as to the subjective prong, CSLI reveals a “large amount of sensitive 
and private information about a person’s movements and activities in public 
and private spaces.”201  However, people “regard access to their location data 
as yielding private data”202 and would be “unpleasantly surprised, if not 
outraged to learn” that the government could freely obtain their location 
information without a warrant.203  Thus, cell phone users “surely entertain a 
subjective expectation of privacy” in CSLI.204 
Second, the objective prong of Katz is also satisfied, as “Americans have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone records” as well.205  
 
 194. See generally Dennis J. Braithwaite & Allison L. Eiselen, Nowhere to Hide?:  An 
Approach to Protecting Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Cell Phone Location Data 
Through the Warrant Requirement, 38 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 287 (2014); Patrick E. Corbett, 
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Wait for the Supremes?, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 215 (2015); Curtis et al., supra note 63; Freiwald, 
supra note 1; Markus & Wessler, supra note 55; Franklin, supra note 89; Robert Harrington, 
Note, Avoiding Scylla and Charybdis:  Why the Third Party Doctrine Is Ill Suited to Treat 
CSLI, and What the State Courts Can Do About It, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 361 (2016). 
 195. See infra notes 199–08 and accompanying text. 
 196. See infra notes 209–19 and accompanying text. 
 197. See infra notes 220–28 and accompanying text. 
 198. See infra notes 229–40 and accompanying text. 
 199. See, e.g., Curtis et al., supra note 63, at 90 (arguing that a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in cell phone records is consistent with Fourth Amendment values); Freiwald, supra 
note 1, at 743–46 (discussing individuals’ subjective and objective expectations of privacy in 
CSLI); Markus & Wessler, supra note 55, at 1204 (contending that “CSLI data . . . violates 
reasonable expectations of privacy”). 
 200. Lockwood, supra note 47, at 315. 
 201. Markus & Wessler, supra note 55, at 1204. 
 202. Freiwald, supra note 1, at 744. 
 203. Id. at 743. 
 204. Id. at 744. 
 205. Curtis et al., supra note 63, at 90 (emphasis added). 
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Generally, people do not expect their locations and movements to be 
monitored by the government through their cell phones.206  And because cell 
phones play a “vital role” in today’s era of private communication,207 
denying Fourth Amendment protection to location data ignores the “set of 
expectations that Americans have” with respect to this information.208 
2.  The Third-Party Doctrine Does Not Apply 
Equally important, scholars further argue that the third-party doctrine is 
inapplicable to CSLI and does not diminish or eliminate a cell phone user’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their location data.209  First, mobile 
phone customers do not “voluntarily” convey their location to service 
providers.210  Because registration automatically occurs every seven seconds, 
users do not enter locational information into their phones—as the defendant 
in Smith had done with the numbers he dialed—nor otherwise “affirmatively 
transmit[]” their location to the service provider.211  Rather, the only 
affirmative action on the part of the user is buying the phone, as CSLI is an 
automatically generated byproduct.212  Therefore, cell phone users could only 
“voluntarily” reveal their location if they understood the mechanics of CSLI 
prior to buying the phone.213 
However, most cell phone users simply lack this knowledge.214  Although 
service providers may include information about CSLI in their contracts, 
customers rarely read these agreements, and even if they do, it is likely not 
in an effort to find a CSLI-related provision.215 
Moreover, even assuming that cell phone users are aware of registration 
and the resulting CSLI, they remain unable to prevent disclosing their 
location to service providers.216  Today, cell phones are a ubiquitous part of 
society.217  Family members, friends, and employers all require us to carry 
and use them, making it “very hard in today’s world to exist without a cell 
phone.”218  As a result, they have become necessary in the modern era and 
refusing to own a phone or keeping one turned off at all times to avoid 
location disclosure is not practical.219 
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3.  CSLI Is Not a Business Record 
In addition to criticizing the third-party doctrine, commentators have also 
attacked the proposition that CSLI is merely a record kept by the service 
provider in the ordinary course of business.220  At least one scholar suggests 
that when the government compels service providers to disclose CSLI, the 
providers do not produce anything that resembles a routine business 
record.221  Rather, the documents disclosed look more like either 
“customized report[s]” tailored to the government’s request or, on the other 
end of the spectrum, “raw data.”222  In either case, the documents produced 
during CSLI disclosure hardly look like information that would be regularly 
kept or presented to a customer.223 
In addition to the records’ form, the nature of the data contained in CSLI 
also “needs to be addressed,”224 as this information should not be treated like 
ordinary business records.225  CSLI provides detailed information about 
people’s communication, movements, and activities—disclosing more 
personal information, such as where users go and how long they spend there, 
than the banking records in Miller.226  Because CSLI reveals this “large 
amount of sensitive and private information,”227 it more closely resembles 
the private communications that were protected by the Fourth Amendment in 
Miller than the financial information that was not.228 
4.  Section 2703(c) Does Not Govern CSLI 
Lastly, some commentators have also questioned whether § 2703(c) of the 
SCA governs CSLI at all.229  Congress defines a mobile “tracking device” as 
“an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the 
movement of a person or object.”230  Because a cell phone creates a record 
of its user’s movements through CSLI, “[i]t makes sense to view a cell phone 
as a tracking device.”231  However, while § 2703(c) covers information 
relating to “electronic communication services,”232 the SCA explicitly 
excludes “tracking device[s]” from its definition of “electronic 
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communication.”233  Thus, cell phones “should be excluded from the scope 
of records” obtainable under § 2703(c).234 
Moreover, even if “tracking devices” were included within the SCA’s 
definition of “electronic communication,” they could still fall outside the 
scope of § 2703(c).235  This section does not govern the content of any 
particular communication, as the government may obtain the “contents 
of . . . electronic communications” only under § 2703(a).236  As one scholar 
notes, “The question is, what counts as contents, and what counts as 
noncontent” information?237  In answering this question, however, a “judge 
could view location data as content information” and therefore obtainable 
only under § 2703(a), not § 2703(c).238 
As a result, courts could construe location records to fall outside the scope 
of § 2703(c) by either viewing cell phones as tracking devices or location 
records as content information.239  In either case, the government would be 
required to obtain a warrant before procuring a cell phone’s locational 
records.240 
C.  Protection of CSLI Records 
The discourse surrounding CSLI not only scrutinizes the circuit courts’ 
decisions but also further advocates for the protection of cell phone location 
data under the Fourth Amendment.  Notably, however, scholars do not agree 
on the extent and nature of that protection and which governmental institution 
is best suited to implement it. 
1.  Judicial Intervention and the Warrant Requirement 
Because many scholars contend that individuals maintain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in CSLI,241 they also argue that the judiciary should 
require the government to obtain a search warrant before procuring this data 
from service providers.242  Given the “accuracy and precision” with which 
CSLI can locate criminal suspects,243 a warrant requirement affords innocent 
Americans protections against overreaching law enforcement activity.244  
And because the technology continues to develop at a rapid pace,245 making 
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it easier for the government to obtain a person’s information, the law must 
respond accordingly by heightening the Fourth Amendment’s protections.246 
However, because the federal appellate courts have not yet held that a 
warrant is necessary, some commentators suggest that state courts should 
implement the requirement.247  Although a decision from the Supreme Court 
or circuit courts would be “preferential,”248 state courts are in a unique 
position to address the problem because they can act as “laboratories in the 
constantly changing world of technology.”249 
The Fourth Amendment acts as a “constitutional floor,” establishing the 
minimum level of protection states must provide to their citizens.250  
However, each state has an “analog” to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.251  State courts, therefore, are free to interpret their 
constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual rights than 
do the provisions of the federal Constitution.252  For example, the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey held that cell phone users have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in CSLI, forcing police to obtain a warrant before procuring 
location data from providers.253  While few states have followed New 
Jersey’s lead,254 one scholar argues that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
holding was “correct” and urges others to follow accordingly.255 
2.  Legislative Solutions and the SCA 
Although a judge may impose a warrant requirement, some commentators 
argue for a legislative resolution to warrantless CSLI disclosure.256  For 
example, some scholars contend that Congress or state legislatures should 
enact a statutory warrant requirement for all CSLI requests by the 
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government,257 while others suggest the SCA’s standard for a court order 
should be amended.258 
The latter approach, proposed by two scholars, permits the government to 
compel a service provider to disclose historical CSLI using only a court 
order.259  However, to obtain the order, the government must satisfy two 
requirements.260  First, it must demonstrate “specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the location 
information requested is relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.”261  Second, the government must also demonstrate “specific 
and articulable facts showing that a reasonable and sufficient nexus exists 
between the alleged or suspected criminal activity . . . and the scope of the 
location data requested.”262 
To be clear, the authors did not propose a warrant requirement for 
historical CSLI disclosure.  However, they hoped that requiring the 
government to justify the scope of its request properly weighed the privacy 
interest of mobile phone users without unduly limiting the police’s ability to 
investigate suspected criminal activity.263 
3.  A Mosaic Approach to CSLI Protection 
Finally, some commentators suggest that the “mosaic theory” of the Fourth 
Amendment should serve as the basis of protection for CSLI.264  Generally, 
the mosaic theory proposes that courts “apply the Fourth Amendment search 
doctrine to government conduct as a collective whole rather than in isolated 
steps.”265  More specifically, rather than considering whether a particular 
governmental act is a search, the theory focuses on whether a series of acts 
together constitutes a search.266  Thus, “premised on aggregation,” it asks 
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“whether a set of nonsearches aggregated together amount to a search 
because their collection and subsequent analysis creates a revealing mosaic” 
about the targeted individual’s life.267  Before turning to theory’s application 
to CSLI, however, it is helpful to consider again the opinions in Jones, from 
which the mosaic theory stems.268 
In Jones, the government physically placed a GPS tracking device on the 
defendant’s car and used it to monitor the vehicle’s location over twenty-
eight days.269  Although the majority resolved the case on trespass 
grounds,270 Justices Alito and Sotomayor analyzed the case on a different 
basis, focusing on the government’s use of GPS surveillance.  Justice Alito 
stated that because people do not expect law enforcement to track an 
individual’s movements over an extended period of time, long-term 
monitoring “impinges on [one’s] expectations of privacy.”271  He then added 
that although the government monitored the defendant’s location for twenty-
eight days, the surveillance transformed into a search at some point “before 
the 4-week mark.”272  Thus, importantly, Justice Alito’s opinion considers 
the amount or period of time over which the government’s conduct persists, 
“which is critical to the mosaic approach.”273 
Similarly, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence also “clearly echoes the 
mosaic theory.”274  She suggested that, in cases of GPS monitoring, the 
proper inquiry focuses on the “sum of one’s public movements.”275  Justice 
Sotomayor then stated that, in the context of government surveillance, the 
analysis should ask whether people “reasonably expect that their movements 
will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to 
ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual 
habits, and so on.”276  Although she agreed with Justice Alito’s concern about 
long-term monitoring, she suggested that even short-term surveillance may 
be troublesome, depending on the amount of information the police are able 
to gather about the individual from the “sum” of their movements.277 
Taken together, Justices Alito’s and Sotomayor’s opinions “create” the 
mosaic theory.278  They focus on the “collective sum of government action,” 
including the amount of time over which the government acts as well as the 
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amount and nature of the information it gathers, rather than on the 
government’s individual actions or singular pieces of data they obtain.279 
As noted, some commentators suggest that courts apply the mosaic 
approach when considering law enforcement’s ability to obtain CSLI from 
service providers.280  As a “more efficient and cost-effective” method of 
surveillance, “CSLI reveals more about a person” than GPS tracking because 
“people carry their cell phones wherever they go:  in purses and pockets, to 
the doctor’s office, to a political gathering, in their own home, and even 
inside their bedroom.”281  Thus, CSLI generates a wealth of information that 
has never before been available in one place to law enforcement officials.282 
As a result, law enforcement’s “[l]ong-term, continuous monitoring of cell 
site location information . . . fall[s] squarely within the contours of the mosaic 
theory.”283  As Justices Alito and Sotomayor suggested, society would not 
expect the police to covertly track and aggregate a person’s every movement 
for long periods of time.284  Because CSLI permits this kind of surveillance, 
cell site location tracking calls for Fourth Amendment protection.285 
However, while the mosaic theory may be one of the “most compelling 
approach[es]” to address government surveillance,286 some scholars have 
pointed out the practical problems that arise when trying to implement it.287  
In particular, Professor Orin S. Kerr thoughtfully details at least four issues 
that courts will need to address in order to administer the approach.288 
The “first question concerns the standard that would govern the mosaic 
theory.”289  Courts will have to articulate what “test determines when a 
mosaic has been created.”290  Otherwise stated, courts will have to develop a 
standard for determining at what point the government’s action gathers 
enough information about an individual such that their Fourth Amendment 
rights have been implicated.291  Moreover, in developing this standard, courts 
will also have to determine which “stages of surveillance a mosaic search” 
includes.292  Under this theory, it is unclear whether the government could 
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satisfy this standard simply by collecting data or whether “subsequent 
analysis and use” of that data would also be required.293 
The second issue that arises when implementing the mosaic theory is a 
“grouping question.”294  Because the theory considers the “collective whole” 
of government conduct, courts will need to determine which conduct, or 
types of conduct, should be “grouped” together when evaluating whether that 
conduct poses a Fourth Amendment issue.295  In turn, this will force courts 
to address several items, including which types of surveillance methods 
prompt the mosaic approach (e.g., GPS or CSLI tracking),296 how long a 
specific tool or method of surveillance must be used before the mosaic theory 
is implicated,297 and how different methods of surveillance used in one case 
should be grouped together, if at all, in determining whether a mosaic has 
been created.298 
The third issue that the theory presents is how courts will “analyze the 
reasonableness of mosaic searches.”299  Because “each mosaic will be 
different,” courts will have to develop a “framework” for determining the 
reasonableness of the government’s action once it has been determined that 
a mosaic has been created.300  For example, given the public/private 
distinction created by Knotts and Karo, courts will have to address whether 
public places will be treated differently than private areas, such as the home, 
or whether all locations in the mosaic will be treated “cumulatively.”301  
Moreover, because mosaics can be created by different methods of 
surveillance, courts will be forced to decide whether one standard should be 
used for mosaics created by all methods of surveillance or whether the 
standard should be different for each method.302 
The last issue that arises when adopting the mosaic theory concerns what 
“remedies” will apply for Fourth Amendment violations.303  After 
determining that the government has violated an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment rights under this theory, courts will then have to decide what 
recourse, if any, is available to the aggrieved party.304  This will require 
courts to decide whether the exclusionary rule applies305 and whether all of 
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the information gathered by the police will be subject to the rule or only the 
information gathered after the point at which the court decides the mosaic 
was created.306  Inevitably, courts will also likely confront situations wherein 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule may be appropriate and, therefore, must 
carefully articulate the scope and application of these exceptions.307  Finally, 
courts will also have to consider whether, and under what circumstances, 
civil remedies may be available to the aggrieved party as well.308 
Despite these obstacles, Kerr acknowledges that the mosaic theory “is 
animated by legitimate concerns.”309  However, he maintains that “courts 
should reject the mosaic theory” because “[it] would be very difficult to 
administer” given the aforementioned issues.310  Moreover, despite having 
confidence in the judiciary to resolve these issues, Kerr notes that the 
challenges to the theory’s implementation are emphasized by the lack of 
expert “opinion on how to apply it.”311 
III.  THE MOSAIC THEORY 
AND WARRANTLESS CSLI MONITORING 
This part aims to reconcile the competing arguments in the debate over 
warrantless CSLI monitoring by suggesting that courts analyze this 
information under the mosaic theory.  This part first joins those who advocate 
for the theory’s adoption and explains why this approach is best suited to 
address the underlying concerns with CSLI tracking.  It then adds to the 
discussion by proposing a standard under which courts may apply the mosaic 
theory to CSLI. 
A.  The Mosaic Theory and the Problem with CSLI Tracking 
The mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment should be applied in the 
context of CSLI because it properly addresses the underlying concerns with 
the government’s use of cell site locational data.  Before the mosaic approach 
can be understood as the appropriate theory to analyze CSLI, however, it is 
necessary to see why both the trespass-based approach and the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test are insufficient to protect the interests at stake. 
The Supreme Court made clear that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test did not replace the trespass-based approach of the Fourth Amendment; it 
merely added to it.312  As previously discussed, under the latter approach, the 
Fourth Amendment protects against physical intrusions upon one’s body or 
property, such as their house, office, and automobile.313  By definition, this 
approach is inapplicable in cases without physical trespass—such as the 
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government’s procurement of CSLI—which the Jones Court conceded 
“would remain subject to Katz analysis.”314 
However, the Katz standard likewise fails to provide an appropriate 
framework for evaluating CSLI disclosure.  The Katz Court held that the 
“Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”315  On one level, the 
argument that CSLI should be protected under this standard undermines this 
holding to the extent that it effectively asks the Fourth Amendment to protect 
the locations contained in cell site location information.  Admittedly, 
however, this conclusion ignores Katz’s idea that it is the individual’s 
expectation of privacy within certain places, such as the level of privacy one 
expects to maintain within their home, that aggrieved parties seek to protect 
under the Fourth Amendment.  Yet, this idea still does not address the 
underlying problems of CSLI monitoring. 
The concern with CSLI tracking is not that individuals expect—or expect 
to maintain—privacy in certain locations.  Rather, the concern stems from 
what one’s presence at a given location can reveal about the details and 
activities of their daily personal life.  As one scholar writes, location data 
permits law enforcement to “draw inferences about the substantive nature of 
the target’s behavior based upon patterns revealed in the data.”316  Not 
surprisingly, the “more data that is available, the more inferences can be 
drawn to create a complete portrait of the subject’s private life.”317  For 
example, as another scholar notes, CSLI can “reveal” or “divulge” when an 
individual has sought medical treatment, visited an abortion clinic, watched 
an X-rated movie, or protested at a political rally.318 
However, while it stretches at least some standards of reasonableness to 
argue that people expect as much “privacy” at a movie theater or public rally 
as they do in their homes, it is easier to understand that people simply may 
not want the government monitoring their personal activities.  The revealing 
nature of location data threatens an individual’s more basic “right to be let 
alone,”319 which “often ha[s] nothing to do with privacy at all.”320  Thus, the 
concerns about CSLI are based not necessarily on where individuals have 
been but rather on the government’s ability to learn the more intimate details 
about who they are and what they are doing. 
The mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment is best suited to address these 
issues because it is concerned with the extent to which the government can 
“learn about a person’s private affairs.”321  As Justice Sotomayor suggested 
in Jones, the analysis should focus on whether “people reasonably expect that 
their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables 
the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious 
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beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”322  Concerned with “individual liberties 
and freedoms,”323 she feared that “[a]wareness that the Government may be 
watching”324 would restrict the “associational and expressive freedoms”325 
people enjoy through their personal activities. 
This Note, therefore, suggests that the mosaic theory is able to reconcile at 
least some of the competing arguments in the debate over warrantless CSLI 
procurement.  On one hand, the circuit courts may have been correct to deny 
CSLI Fourth Amendment protection under the Katz standard.  However, this 
Note does not suggest that these decisions were correct because of their 
reliance on the third-party doctrine and business record analogy.  Rather, they 
are correct to the extent that the Katz standard is an inappropriate framework 
under which to properly analyze mobile phone users’ concerns with CSLI 
surveillance.  On the other hand, the mosaic theory can still provide those 
who advocate for constitutional protection of CSLI with an approach to 
achieve that goal, along with five Justices who may be ready to embrace it.326 
B.  The Mosaic Analysis 
Indeed, the five votes that Justices Alito’s and Sotomayor’s concurrences 
received suggest the Supreme Court may be on the verge of changing its 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by adopting the mosaic theory.  These 
votes, along with support for the theory among scholars and students, may 
also encourage lower courts to apply this approach before the Supreme Court 
has a chance to make such a change.  However, courts choosing to do so will 
need to address the practical challenges that the theory poses as well as 
balance the government’s interest in investigating criminal activity. 
This Note creates a framework under which courts could apply the mosaic 
theory to CSLI by offering a resolution to two of the issues that arise in the 
theory’s administration.  First, this Note contends that CSLI monitoring 
should be a method of government surveillance subject to mosaic analysis.327  
Second, this Note offers a standard for determining whether the CSLI records 
obtained constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.328  Importantly, this Note recognizes the difficulty in resolving 
these issues, as well as the others carefully outlined by Professor Kerr,329 and 
it does not purport to provide a method by which the mosaic theory is 
seamlessly implanted into existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
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Nonetheless, it does more than argue that the mosaic theory should be applied 
to CSLI:  it also proposes a standard for how the theory may be applied. 
The first issue to consider is the types or methods of surveillance that 
would be subject to a mosaic analysis.  As stated above, the mosaic theory 
should apply to warrantless CSLI monitoring because of the amount of 
information it can reveal, the length of time over which it can be used, and 
its inexpensive cost to the government—features similar to those of the GPS 
tracking device in Jones.330  Importantly, Justice Sotomayor noted that these 
features “require[d] particular attention”331 before articulating the standard 
under which she would analyze government surveillance.332  Furthermore, 
cell site location data can be easily aggregated over extended periods of time, 
such as over a 221-day period.333  As a result, CSLI has the potential to offer 
information about an individual that as a whole is “more revealing” than the 
individual data points it consists of, placing cell phone location data 
appropriately within the confines of the mosaic theory.334  Therefore, in cases 
where law enforcement officers procure and use CSLI without a warrant, the 
constitutionality of their conduct should be subject to a mosaic analysis. 
Other methods of surveillance that share these attributes, improve upon 
them, or add to them may also be appropriate to analyze under the mosaic 
theory.  While this Note does not endeavor to compare the methods of 
surveillance available to and used by law enforcement, courts implementing 
the mosaic theory will have to consider which techniques would be subject 
to its analysis, which is no doubt challenging.335  Additionally, there are 
legitimate concerns that arise with having multiple theories of the Fourth 
Amendment—each applicable in different circumstances.336  Nonetheless, 
given the “emerging technologies”337 of government surveillance, crafting 
one theory to cover all methods of surveillance may hinder a court’s ability 
to properly analyze one particular method that would more appropriately be 
considered under a different approach.338 
The second, and more difficult, issue to resolve under the mosaic theory is 
the standard that would govern its application.  Courts will have to develop a 
standard for determining at what point the government has gathered a 
 
 330. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that GPS tracking 
reveals a wealth of information about an individual, is inexpensive, and can be used for years). 
 331. Id. at 955. 
 332. Id. at 956 (“I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into account when 
considering the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s 
public movements.  I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will 
be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less 
at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”). 
 333. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 341 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 
421 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 334. Selva et al., supra note 264, at 255 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 
561 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub. nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945). 
 335. See Kerr, supra note 265, at 329. 
 336. See Curtis et al., supra note 63, at 89–91 (describing the issues that can develop with 
having different theories of Fourth Amendment law). 
 337. Selva et al., supra note 264, at 236. 
 338. See Rice, supra note 73, at 24 (noting that the law associated with government 
surveillance “may need to adapt” with advances in the technology enabling that surveillance). 
2017] CSLI TRACKING AND THE MOSAIC THEORY 2415 
sufficient amount of information such that the target’s Fourth Amendment 
rights have been implicated.339  In other words, the standard will determine 
at what point the government has conducted a “search” within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.  Assuming that warrantless CSLI monitoring is 
subject to a mosaic analysis, the question here, then, is what that analysis 
entails. 
Kerr explains that Justices Alito and Sotomayor offer different standards, 
each reflective of their respective concerns with government surveillance.340  
He adds that courts “will have to choose”341 one to adopt and suggests that 
doing so is “particularly difficult.”342 
In the context of CSLI, however, the standard should reflect the ideas of 
both Justices Alito and Sotomayor, as well as the underlying concerns with 
CSLI monitoring.  More specifically, courts should adopt a “totality-of-the-
circumstances” approach and analyze a nonexhaustive list of “factors” 
reflective of these concerns.  Thus, whether all of the CSLI records obtained 
by police in a given case creates a “mosaic,” or constitutes a “search,” would 
depend on (1) the amount of time covered by the CSLI records,343 (2) the 
amount of information that the CSLI records contained and whether it 
enabled the government to learn details about the target’s personal life,344 (3) 
the cost to the government in procuring the CSLI records and the ease with 
which it was able to obtain them from the service provider,345 and (4) whether 
people would expect law enforcement to be able to gather the particular 
collection of CSLI at issue.346 
Admittedly, this approach is not conducive to a neat and articulable 
standard such as the Katz two-prong test.  However, using the totality of law 
enforcement behavior and outside circumstances to determine the legality of 
police conduct would not be a “novel” endeavor and is in fact 
“commonplace” within Fourth Amendment law.347  Moreover, because the 
mosaic theory considers government conduct “as a collective whole,”348 the 
standard for analyzing such conduct should appropriately permit 
consideration of all the surrounding circumstances.  Additionally, because 
the list of factors is nonexhaustive, courts are free to add to the analysis if 
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CSLI tracking presents new concerns not addressed here.  Lastly, the final 
factor concerning the public’s expectation of CSLI monitoring specifically 
serves to balance the interests of cell phone users and law enforcement 
officials, as it can adjust according to the government’s use, misuse, or disuse 
of CSLI monitoring. 
Ultimately, however, the proposed standard does not resolve all of the 
issues with the mosaic theory.  Nonetheless, the theory is better suited to 
address the concerns with CSLI monitoring than the trespass-based approach 
or Katz test.  The standard and factors proposed account for these concerns 
and can serve as an initial consideration of how warrantless CSLI monitoring 
may be translated into a “search” restricted by the Fourth Amendment.  
Lastly, at the very least, this Note hopes that by subjecting CSLI tracking to 
a mosaic analysis and offering a standard under which that analysis can take 
place, a more complete framework for implementing the theory in CSLI-
related cases can be developed. 
CONCLUSION 
Given that five circuit courts have almost uniformly dismissed the Katz 
test as a viable option to protect CSLI, scholars and judges should give 
serious consideration to new analyses with the potential to address 
governmental surveillance.  Moreover, as technology continues to improve, 
it is likely that new methods of surveillance will face the same result under a 
Katz analysis because individuals in today’s world disclose their location and 
other information to third parties in everyday activities. 
In the context of CSLI, the mosaic theory provides one such alternative.  
This approach should be adopted as the analysis under which courts 
determine the legality of warrantless CSLI monitoring by law enforcement.  
The theory best reflects the concerns that mobile phone customers have with 
CSLI tracking and can serve as a viable option to protect this information. 
Nevertheless, the issues that arise in administering this theory are 
challenging.  This Note resolves some of them by proposing an open standard 
that courts may use to analyze CSLI under the mosaic approach.  More 
importantly, though, this Note’s efforts should serve as an invitation to other 
advocates of the theory to critique this standard and likewise attempt to 
resolve the approach’s other issues.  After all, as Professor Kerr rightly 
instructs, “proponents of the [mosaic] theory should answer” the very 
questions it raises.349 
Moreover, failure to a find an alternative to the Katz test likely leaves CSLI 
without Fourth Amendment protection.  Perhaps more poignantly, though, it 
leaves an individual’s basic “right to be let alone” vulnerable to overreaching 
surveillance through a device people carry every second of every day.350 
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